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To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended
to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer
means a real peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adversary
system, he deems that his sole duty is to protect his client—guilty or
innocent—and that in such a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help
society solve its crime problem. Under this conception of criminal
procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.
—Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Opinion of Jackson, J.)
No other case comes to mind in which an administrative official is
permitted the broad discretionary power assumed by the police
interrogator, together with the power to prevent objective recordation of
the facts. The absence of a record makes disputes inevitable about the
conduct of the police and, sometimes, about what the prisoner has
actually said. It is secrecy, not privacy, which accounts for the absence of
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